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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM:
Stuart A. Williams and WSC Investments, LLC (collectively “Williams”) filed this
3action against the Hilton Group, plc and Ladbrokes International Betting and Gaming, a
division of the Hilton Group (collectively “Ladbrokes”), alleging breach of contract in
connection with Williams’s efforts to purchase various North American gaming assets
owned by Ladbrokes. Williams subsequently amended his complaint, adding claims
against Hilton for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation and punitive damages and
adding Alan Ross, the Managing Director of Ladbrokes, as a defendant on the tort claims. 
The case was originally assigned to Judge Donald J. Lee but was later reassigned to Judge
Arthur J. Schwab, who granted summary judgment in favor of Ladbrokes on the tort
claims asserted.  This decision was based on Pennsylvania’s “gist of the action” doctrine. 
The District Court certified its order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b)(2), and a motion panel of our court permitted the appeal.  Although neither the
order of the District Court nor the application for review specified the precise question or
questions presented for interlocutory review, see Fed. R. App. Proc. 5(b)(1)(B), the issues
are sufficiently clear to permit the appeal to go forward.  We hold that the “gist of the
action” doctrine bars the tort claims at issue.
As a preliminary matter, we reject Williams’s argument that the law-of- the-case
doctrine precluded Judge Schwab from granting summary judgment for Ladbrokes on the
tort claims.  Williams contends that Judge Lee had previously held that the “gist of the
action” doctrine did not apply to the claims at issue, but we disagree.  Williams’s papers
cited some “gist of the action” cases and maintained that his contract and fraud claims
4could coexist, see App. at 2373-74, 2380-82, but Judge Lee’s opinion made no direct or
indirect reference to the doctrine, and it was not necessary for Judge Lee to decide the
issue in order to make the rulings that he did .  
We also reject Williams’s argument that the “gist of the action” doctrine does not
bar his tort claims.  Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly adopted
this doctrine, we predict that the state supreme court would adopt the doctrine as set out
in the Superior Court’s cases.  
In Etoll, Inc. v. Elias/Savion Advertising, Inc., 811 A.2d 10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002),
the Pennsylvania Superior Court, stated that the “gist of the action” doctrine “is designed
to maintain the conceptual distinction between breach of contract claims and tort claims
[by] preclud[ing] plaintiffs from recasting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort
claims.”  Id. at 14.  The Court then described the difference between contract and tort
claims as follows: “Tort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a matter of
social policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties imposed by mutual
consensus agreements between particular individuals.”  Id. (quoting Bash v. Bell
Telephone Co., 601 A.2d 825, 829 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).  In Etoll the Court found that
the “fraud at issue was not so tangential to the parties’ relationship so as to make fraud
the gist of the action.”  Etoll, 811 A.2d at 21.   Rather, the court stated, the fraud claims
were so “inextricably intertwined with the contract claims” that they were barred as a
matter of law from being raised independently.  Id.  The Superior Court has applied the
5“gist of the action” doctrine in other cases.  See, e.g., Pittsburgh Construction Co. v.
Griffith, 834 A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003) (applying Etoll and stating that  “courts are
cautious about permitting tort recovery based on contractual breaches”); Pennsylvania
Manufacturers Association Insurance Co. v. L.B. Smith, 831 A.2d 1178, 1181 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003) (“The ‘gist of the action’ doctrine is designed to maintain the conceptual
distinction between breach of contract and tort claims.”); Freestone v. New England Log
Homes, Inc., 819 A.2d 550 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003); see also Bohler-Uddeholm America,
Inc. v. Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2001). From our examination of
the Pennsylvania cases, we conclude that the “gist of the action” doctrine cannot be
captured by any precisely worded test.  Instead, the doctrine appears to call for a fact-
intensive judgment as to the true nature of a claim.  
In making the requisite inquiry here, a recent case from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania is instructive.  In Penn City Investments,
Inc. v. Soltech, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22321 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2003), the Court
held that the doctrine barred a fraudulent inducement claim where the defendant-counter-
claimant alleged that the counter-defendant had made pre-contract statements in order to
induce it to enter into a contractual relationship.  The Court held that the fraudulent
inducement claim was barred because the “pre-contractual statements concerned specific
duties that the parties later outlined in the contract.”  Id. at *12; see also id. at *15
(dismissing the tort claims because they were “directly addressed by the contract, or so
6closely related to the contractual relationship, that the dispute between the parties [needed
to be] resolved by exclusive reference to contractual principles”).  
Here, Williams contends that his fraud claims are not for fraud in the performance
of a contract but are akin to claims for fraud in the inducement because Ladbrokes
“induced Williams into signing the Letter of Intent and dealing with Ladbrokes by lying
about its intent to honor the agreement.” Appellants’ Br. at 25.  According to Williams,
Ladbrokes and Ross engaged in a scheme by which they induced Williams to “commit to
buying the properties for $120 million on an exclusive basis, while secretly marketing the
properties to other buyers.”  Id. at 26.  The Letter of Intent, they assert,  was the device by
which Williams was induced and deceived.  
Applying the case law cited above, we conclude that Williams’s tort claims are
barred.  Williams’s tort claims are all founded on Ladbrokes’ agreement to grant him the
exclusive right to purchase the North American assets during the due diligence period. 
Williams and Ladbrokes are sophisticated parties who were well able to protect their
rights in relation to this matter by contract, and they attempted to do so.  On the particular
facts presented here, we agree with the District Court that the “gist” of Williams’s claims
sounds in contract, not tort.  Because of the nature of the “gist of the action” doctrine and
because clarification of the doctrine for precedential purposes must come from the state
courts, further explanation of our holding in this case would not be fruitful.  
Finally, we hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that the doctrine
7barred Williams’s claims against Ross, as well as his claims against Ladbrokes.   
Although Williams did not have a contractual relationship with Ross, Williams cannot
detach Ross from his status as an agent for Ladbrokes.  Ross served as the principal
negotiator for Ladbrokes.  As the Pennsylvania courts have spelled out, the gist of the
action doctrine bars tort claims against an individual defendant where the contract
between the plaintiff and the officer’s company created the duties that the individual
allegedly breached.  See Flynn Co. v. Peerless Door & Glass, Inc., 2002 WL 1018937, at
*3 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 15, 2002) (stating that because it was the contract between the
“plaintiff and defendants that created the duties which Pratt [the individual in question]
allegedly breached” that the gist of the action doctrine barred a suit against the company’s
officer); Atchison Casting Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 2003 WL 1847665, at * 1
(Pa. Com. Pl. March 14, 2003) (dismissing tort claims against corporation and individual
defendants who were employees of corporation on basis of the gist of the action doctrine);
Flynn Co. v. Cytometrics, Inc., 2000 WL 33711055, at *4 (Pa. Com. Pl. Nov. 17, 2000)
(dismissing misrepresentation claims against corporation and its employees individually
under the gist of the action doctrine because the alleged misrepresentations were breaches
of the exclusive representation agreement).  All of Ross’s alleged misrepresentations
concerned matters governed by the Letter of Intent between Ladbrokes and Williams. 
After reviewing, all of Williams’s arguments, we affirm the District Court order
granting summary judgment in favor of Ladbrokes on the tort claims at issue.   
8BECKER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s disposition of the law of the case issue. 
However, I disagree with the majority’s interpretation and application of the Pennsylvania
“gist of the action” jurisprudence, hence this dissent from the judgment.  I believe that the
majority reads Pennsylvania law too narrowly.  I also believe that its abbreviated and
antiseptic rendering of the underlying facts belies the true nature and ultimate essence of
Ladbrokes’ conduct, which (if proven) would render it liable in tort.  I begin with a fuller
description of that conduct, from which it will be apparent that the written agreement, on
which the majority focuses, is not the central fact of the case but rather a mere instrument
of Ladbrokes’ fraudulent scheme.
I.
In June 1999, plaintiff Stuart Williams was approached by Ladbrokes to
solicit his interest as a potential buyer for Ladbrokes’ North American gaming businesses. 
By July 1999, Williams and Alan Ross, representing Ladbrokes, had reached an oral
understanding that Williams would purchase several of Ladbrokes’ casinos, betting
parlors and racetracks for $120 million cash.  They then negotiated the terms of a binding
letter of intent.  When Ross first met Williams, he had not yet tested the market for the
properties, but he did not want to preclude a deal with Williams if he was unable to get a
higher price elsewhere.  Williams insisted that he have the exclusive right to purchase the
properties during the period of due diligence and final agreement drafting.  Indeed
9Williams told Ross that he would not spend “one minute” of his time or “one penny” of
his money pursuing a transaction unless Ladbrokes intended to deal exclusively with him. 
Ross did not want exclusivity but, recognizing that Williams would not proceed further
without it, he ultimately assured Williams that Ladbrokes would deal exclusively with
him; the consideration was a hefty purchase price.  Although the assurance of exclusivity
was memorialized in the letter of intent and signed by Williams and Ladbrokes, it is clear
from the record that Ladbrokes and Ross never intended to provide exclusivity to
Williams.
The record is uncontradicted that Ladbrokes and Ross, even as they
negotiated specifically with Williams about exclusivity and extracted additional
consideration from him in exchange for it, secretly marketed the properties to others. 
When asked by Williams whether Ladbrokes had engaged or was engaging in such
discussions, Ross lied and told Williams “no,” and when asked in his deposition why he
had not disclosed his contacts with other potential buyers to Williams, Ross answered,
“Why would I?”  An internal Ladbrokes memorandum written by Ross stated that he
intended merely to “keep [Williams] in the running” while he shopped the properties to
third parties.
Moreover, throughout August and September 1999, Ross repeatedly lied to
Williams about Williams’s access to due diligence materials, and about the solicitation of
offers for the property under agreement with Williams.  When Williams told Ross that he
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was concerned about the continuing delays and excuses, and specifically asked Ross
whether Ladbrokes was dealing with others, Ross told Williams, “You don’t have
anything to worry about,” and “you’re just overreacting.”  But, on July 28, 1999, the same
day Ross signed the letter of intent, Ross had sent documents relating to some of the
properties to one prospective purchaser and a confidentiality agreement to another.   On
August 3, Ross met another potential buyer and discussed the possible acquisition of the
properties, including purchase price.  And on August 5, Ross met and negotiated with two
other prospective purchasers.  Then, on August 10, Ross met with another interested
party, who made an offer.  Also that day, another Ladbrokes executive faxed financial
statements and other financial information for the Pennsylvania properties to still another
potential buyer.
On August 26, 1999, Ladbrokes issued a press release indicating an intent
to sell its North American properties, including the businesses covered by the letter of
intent.  Strikingly, the press release made no mention of Williams or the letter of intent. 
In response, at least seven more individuals expressed their interest in purchasing some or
all of the properties.  By the end of August, Ross had sent financial information to another
prospective purchaser and offered to meet with him the following week.  Over the course
of the next week, Ross continued to meet with other possible buyers and received a
concrete offer from one of them.
Williams called Ross immediately after becoming aware of the August 26,
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1999 press release.  Ross told Williams that “the press release really didn’t have anything
to do with our transaction.”  Ross further told Williams “not to worry, that this transaction
was absolutely [his].”  Ross also reminded Williams that Ladbrokes’ board had “approved
the transaction.”  After further conversations, Ladbrokes’ CEO Peter George wrote
confirming that Ladbrokes would “not solicit expressions of interest,” would not
“negotiat[e] terms of sale and purchase” with any third parties, and would not give any
third parties access to the data room during the period that Williams had access.  And yet
on September 3, 1999, at about the same time Ross and George were assuring Williams
they had not and would not solicit expressions of interest of send financial or legal
documents to anyone else, Ross wrote a memo to George stating that Ross intended to
“keep [Williams] in the running” while he continued to shop the gaming business.
Throughout September 1999, “the beat went on.”  The short of it is that
defendants’ repeated lies and misrepresentations were made to string Williams along
while Ladbrokes and Ross continued to shop the properties to third parties.  As Judge
Lee, who preceded Judge Schwab in the case, found in connection with his grant of
summary judgment on the issue of the defendant’s breach of their obligation to negotiate
in good faith under the letter of intent, “Ross and other Ladbrokes’ officers and
employees aggressively shopped around the gaming interests as to which Williams had
just been granted exclusivity rights.”  This conduct continued even after Ladbrokes finally
gave Williams access to the due diligence materials on September 22, 1999.  There were
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further discussions between Ladbrokes and Williams which ultimately imploded when
Ladbrokes purchased, at a heavy discount, $54 million in bonds that Williams had
expected to assume.
II.
I do not quarrel with the majority’s general statement of the relevant
Pennsylvania jurisprudence, i.e., that the “gist of the action” doctrine “is designed to
maintain the conceptual distinction between breach of contract claims and tort claims [by]
preclud[ing] plaintiffs from recasting ordinary breach of contract claims into tort claims,”
and that “[t]ort actions lie for breaches of duties imposed by law as a matter of social
policy, while contract actions lie only for breaches of duties imposed by mutual consensus
agreements between particular individuals.”   And see Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc. v.
Ellwood Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2001) (alteration in original):
[T]he important difference between contract and
tort actions is that the latter lie from the breach
of duties imposed as a matter of social policy
while the former lie for the breach of duties
imposed by mutual consensus
Redevelopment Auth. of Cambria Cty. v. International Ins.
Co., 454 Pa. Super. 374, 685 A.2d 581, 590 (1996) (en banc)
(quoting Phico Ins. Co. v. Presbyterian Med. Servs. Corp.,
444 Pa. Super. 221, 663 A.2d 753, 757 (1995)).  In other
words, a claim should be limited to a contract claim when
“the parties’ obligations are defined by the terms of the
contracts, and not by the larger social policies embodied in the
law of torts.”  Bash v. Bell Tel. Co., 411 Pa. Super. 347, 601
A.2d 825, 830 (1992).
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I do, however, disagree with what I see as a crabbed view of Pennsylvania’s
willingness to apply tort principles where the facts show that a party to an alleged contract
had a fraudulent intent with respect to its contractual promises.  As I read the
Pennsylvania cases, where, as here, there was fraudulent intent, i.e. a subjective and
undisclosed intent not to perform, a fraud claim is stated.  
Let me begin with basic principles.  If a party to a contract misrepresents his
or her  present intention to perform, he or she has committed the tort of misrepresentation. 
On the other hand, if a party had a present intention to perform but later fails to perform,
deliberately or otherwise, the action ordinarily is one for breach of contract, unless the
breaching party gives knowingly false assurances of performance, in which case an action
for misrepresentation can also lie.  See 5 Corbin on Contracts § 1077 at 238 (Supp. Fall
2001) (“If a party attempts to commit fraud, he should not be insulated from liability for
punitive damages, just because the means he has chosen for achieving his fraud happen to
involve a breach of contract.”).  As we held in Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real
Estate Equity & Mortgage Investments, 951 F.2d 1399, 1410 (3d Cir. 1991), under
Pennsylvania law, “‘[a] statement of present intention which is false when uttered may
constitute a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact.’” (quoting Brentwater Homes, Inc. v.
Weibley, 369 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. 1977)) (alteration in original).  
My view of the open texture of Pennsylvania law in this area is supported
by Jahanshahi v. Centura Development Co. 816 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Super. 2003), which
14
applied an analogous misfeasance/nonfeasance analysis.  It is also supported by a number
of federal district court cases applying Pennsylvania law.  See, e.g., Precision Printing
Co. v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 338, 356 (W.D. Pa. 1998) (“[A] promise
which the promisor had no intention of keeping at the time he made it may be actionable
as fraud.”); Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v. Cent. Asia Capital Corp., 974 F. Supp. 822, 843
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (“‘[A] cause of action for fraud can be predicated on future promises if
the defendant knew at the time he made the promise that he would not carry it out.’”
(quoting Killian v. McCulloch, 850 F. Supp. 1239, 1255 (E.D. Pa., 1994)); Fox’s Foods,
Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 870 F. Supp. 599, 609 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (holding there was sufficient
evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant did not intend to perform when the
promise was made); Ebeling & Reuss, Ltd. v. Swarovski, Int’l, 1992 WL 211554 *9 (E.D.
Pa. August 25, 1992) (“[A] party can be liable for fraud if the party intended not to
comply with the terms of the contract at the inception of the contractual relationship.”).
I read the majority opinion as having twin foci.  On the one hand, whenever
fraudulent misrepresentations to induce a contract result in specific duties outlined in the
later contract between sophisticated parties, the majority would bar an action in tort.  On
the other hand, candidly acknowledging the opaqueness and fluidity of the Pennsylvania
gist of the action jurisprudence, the majority really seems to be making an impressionistic
judgment as to whether the action sounds in contract or tort.  I’ll take it either way.  The
first focus, I respectfully suggest, is simply wrong as a matter of the history of the gist of
15
the action doctrine.  The second, which seems to supply the majority’s ratio decidendi,
does not, I submit, square with the facts.
History tells us that sophisticated parties can be duped, especially when,
like the late Tug McGraw, they want to believe.  The faithless Ross was a master duper. 
As Judge Lee held, the facts support the conclusion:
That Alan Ross and Ladbrokes deliberately and intentionally
deceived plaintiffs and strung them along while shopping
their business and properties around to third parties, knowing
that plaintiffs would be incurring significant expenses toward
due diligence on a deal defendants decided they were not
going to consummate.
And as Judge Lee recognized, presented with the facts I have chronicled, a reasonable
jury certainly could conclude that Ladbrokes, through Ross, entered into the letter of
intent in order to induce Williams to keep his money on the table, with no present
intention of honoring its contractual obligations.
The evidence here is overwhelming and uncontradicted.  It reflects an
egregious fraud, papered over by a contract.  It is also a case in which “the parties’
obligations are defined . . . by the larger social policies embodied in the law of torts.” 
Bohler-Uddeholm America, Inc., supra.  I believe that Pennsylvania would, on these
facts, recognize a tort claim.  I would therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment in
favor of Ladbrokes (and, a fortiori, of Ross) and remand for a trial on Williams’ fraud
claim.
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